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Executive Summary
The ratio of controller-to-reliever medication use has been proposed as a meas-
ure of treatment quality for asthma patients. Inthis study we examine the
effects of plan-level mean out-of-pocket asthma medication patient copayments
and other features of benefit plan design on the use of controller medications
alone, controller and reliever medications (combination therapy), and reliever
medications alone. The 1995-2000 MarketScanTM claims data were used to con-
struct plan-level out-of-pocket copayment and physician/practiceprescriber
preference variables for asthma medications. Separate multinomial logit mod-
els were estimated for patients in fee-for-service (FFS) and non-FFS plans relat-
ing benefit plan design features, physician/practice prescribing preferences,
patient demographics, patient comorbidities, and county-level income vari-
ables to patient-level asthma treatment patterns. We find that the controller-to-
reliever ratio rose steadily over 1995-2000, along with out-of-pocket payments
for asthma medications, which rose more for controllers than for relievers.
After controlling for other variables, however, plan-level mean out-of-pocket
copayments were not found to have a statistically significantinfluence on
patient-level asthma treatment patterns. On the other hand, physician/practice
prescribing pattems strongly influenced patient-level treatment pattems. There
is no strong statistical evidence that higher levels of out-of-pocket copayments
for prescription drugs influence asthma treatment patterns. However,
physician/practice prescribing preferences influence patient treatment.
I.Introduction
It has long been known that trade-offs exist between the gainsfrom
pooling across individuals to insure against catastrophic medical96 Crown, Berndt, Baser, et al.
expenditures and the efficiency losses from the moral hazard effects that
arise because of the implicit marginal subsidies to health services uti-
lization occuring under conventional medical insurance plans.1 The exis-
tence of this trade-off suggests that, given preferences and costs, there
may be an optimal amount of coinsurance. Using data from the RAND
Health Insurance Experiment in the 1980s, Manning and Marquis (1996)
have estimated that, with an $8,000 capon total expenditures, the
optimal coinsurance rate would have been about 50 percent.2
Although coinsurance rates for office visits,emergency room visits,
inpatient hospitalization, and prescription drug serviceswere set equal
in the design of the RAND Health Insurance Experiment,current prac-
tice in the United States means that coinsurance and,more commonly,
patient copayment amounts differ considerably among the different
categories of health care services.3
Within the last decade, considerable controversy has arisen involv-
ing the design of prescription drug benefits in health insurance plans.
This controversy partly reflects the fact that prescription drugs have
become an increasingly important component of healthcare costs, ris-
ing sharply from 5.6 percent in 1980 to 9.7 percent in 2000. Continuing
a recent pattern, in 2001 total prescription drug expenditures in the
United States increased by about 17 percent to $154.5 billion.5
Managed-care organizations and the employers with whom they
contract have attempted to control rising prescription drug costs by
changing cost-sharing provisions, seeking to steeruse to preferred
drugs on the insurer's list of approved medications (formularies).6
Already in the early and mid-1990s, plans began experimenting with
two-tier copayment schemes in which a low patientcopay (say, $5) was
assessed for a generic (first-tier) drug, and a somewhat higher but still
modest copay (say, $10) was assessed for branded (second-tier) drugs;
in some rare cases, physicians needed prior authorization from the
payer before being granted permission to prescribe particularly costly
medications.
After continued increases in prescription drug costs, in the mid- and
late 1990s some plans began implementing lessgenerous three-tier
copay schemes. A typical three-tier plan design of several years ago
consisted of a $5 copay for a first-tier generic drug, a $10copay for a
preferred branded drug within a given therapeutic class (the second
tier); and a heftier $25 copay for the nonpreferred branded (third-tier)
drugs within the therapeutic class. Many plans also hada second, more
generous three-tier system for mail-order pharmacy prescriptions.Benefit Plan Design and Prescription Drug Utilization 97
Use of the three-tier copayment designs created incentives not only
for insurees to shift toward increased use of the less costly medications,
but it also gave insurance plans and payers increased bargaining power
with pharmaceutical companies by allowing them to threaten to banish
their branded products to the third tier unless drug manufacturers
offered the payer substantial discounts or rebates.7
Frustrated again by continued increases in prescription drug spend-
ing, many plans have recently increased the levels of prescription drug
copayments at all three tiers, with the third-tier copayment ashigh as
$40 or $50 per prescription; other plans have turned to the use of coin-
surance rather than copayment designs. According to one source,in
2000 the average patient retail copayment for a generic first-tier drug
was $7.17; for preferred brands in the second tier, it was$14.14; and for
all other nonpreferred brands on the third tier, it was$27.35.8
The increased use of multi-tier copayment design mechanisms for pre-
scription drugs raises at least two sets of important issues. (1) Do varia-
tions in copay structures alter the level and composition of prescription
drug utilization? Are they effective instruments in controlling prescrip-
tion drug costs?9 Or do persistent physician prescribing patterns domi-
nate, with copayment variations having only a negligible impact? (2) To
the extent three-tier copays affect the level and composition of drug uti-
lization, what are the associated health outcomes? Can copayment
design mechanisms be used not only to control costs but also to steer
utilization to more medically appropriate uses of prescription drugs?1°
In this paper, we examine the first set of questions in detail;
although we discuss possibilities concerning the second set, we leave
it largely for future research. We also examine variation over time and
among plans involving copayments for other medical services,such as
physician office visits, emergency room treatments, and inpatient
hospitalizations.
We address these issues using the therapeutic class of asthma med-
ications as a case study. As described in detail below, asthma drugs can
be envisioned as being primarily reliever medications (used to relieve
symptoms in an acute asthmatic exacerbationan asthma attack) or as
being primarily controller medications (used to control pulmonary
inflammation and prevent an attack). For some time now, health care
officials have argued that the appropriate use of controller medications
can result in reduced outpatient office visits, emergency roomtreat-
ments, and inpatient hospitalizations.11 While the optimal ratioof
asthma controller to reliever drug utilization is difficult to quantify98 Crown, Berndt, Baser, et al.
precisely (and likely is patient idiosyncratic), it is widely believed that
in most cases increases in the controller-to-reliever ratioare beneficial
in terms of both economic and medical considerations.12 A recent his-
torical overview of trends in asthma pharmacotherapy between 1978
and 2002 by Stafford et al. (2002) suggests that, particularly in the last
decade, the controller-to-reliever ratio has increased while the number
of asthma-related office visits has stabilized or declined.
Before proceeding with a discussion of hypotheses to be tested,
underlying data, and econometric methods, we first digress and
provide some medical background on asthma and its treatment.
Background on Asthma and Its Treatment
Asthma is a chronic disease characterized by inflammation of the air-
ways and constricted bronchial tubes. Asthma affects about 6 percent
of the population and is the third most common chronic condition
among children. Although death from asthma is fairly unusual, mor-
bidity from the condition is common. Since 1991, whenconsensus
guidelines on the treatment of asthma were first released by the
National Asthma Education Program (1991), clinicians haveencour-
aged the use of maintenance therapy, typically using inhaled corticos-
teriods to control inflammation and to reverse chronic airway
obstruction and hyperreactivity Other medications, particularly the
short-acting beta-two agonist class of bronchodilators,are recom-
mended as reserves for relief of acute episodes of bronchospasm.13
Several published articles have examined the benefits that have
accrued as the preference of controllerover reliever medications for
asthma maintenance therapy has gained acceptance.14 Some of these
articles have attempted to correlate a particular metric, commonly
called the C/B ratio (the ratio of inhaled corticosteroids to bron-
chodilators) with populationwide changes in survival and medical
services utilization.15 Greater use of inhaled corticosteriods relative to
bronchodilators has been reported to be associated with lower mortal-
ity rates and less frequent use of emergency room, inpatient, and
outpatient services in the care of patients with asthma.'6
Hypothesis to Be Tested/Assessed Empirically
We empirically assess the effects of several benefit plan design features
on asthma treatment patterns. In particular, we test the hypothesis thatBenefit Plan Design and Prescription Drug Utilization 99
higher controller/reliever copay ratios will be associated withreduced
use of controller medications, otherfactors being equal, and whether
any effects differ by plan type: fee-for-service(FFS) versus non-FFS
plans. Finally, we examine whether physician/practiceprescribing pat-
terns influence patient-level asthma treatment patternsand, if so,
whether these effects differ between FFS and non-FFS plans.
IV.Data Sources and Construction of Variables
The MarketScanTM private insurance database for 1995-2000 was
used in this study. MarketScanTM is the largest database of itskind
and contains detailed descriptions of inpatient, outpatientmedical,
and outpatient prescription drug services for approximately3 mil-
lion persons in 2000 who were covered bycorporate-sponsored
health care plans. These individuals' health care was providedunder
various fee-for-service (FFS), fully capitated, and partiallycapitated
health plans, including exclusive provider organizations,preferred
provider organizations, point-of-service plans, indemnity plans,and
health maintenance organizations.
Race, ethnicity and income information were extracted from adif-
ferent data set: the Bureau of Health Professions Area ResourceFile
(ARF), a compendium of county-level information producedannually.
The ARF data were then merged with the Medstat analyticfile by
county.
Identification of Asthma Patients
Patients with evidence of asthma were selected from theintersection of
the medical claims and encounter records, enrollment files,and phar-
maceutical data files. Evidence of asthma was provided by searching
the claims data during 1995-2000 for individuals meeting at least one
of the following criteria:
At least two outpatient claims with primary or secondarydiagnoses
of asthma.
At least one emergency room claim with primary diagnosisof
asthma, and a drug transaction for an asthma drug ninety days prior or
seven days following the emergency roomclaim.
At least one inpatient claim with a primary diagnosis ofasthma.
A secondary diagnosis of asthma and a primarydiagnosis of
respiratory infection in an outpatient or inpatient claim100 Crown, Berndt, Baser, et al.
At least one drug transaction for a(n) anti-inflammatoryagent, oral
anti-leukotrienes, long-acting bronchodilators,or inhaled or oral short-
acting beta-agonists.
Patients with a diagnosis of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
(COPD) and who had one or more diagnosis or procedure codes indi-
cating pregnancy or delivery or who were not continuously enrolled
for twenty-four months were excluded fromour study group.
Measures
Sociodemographic Characteristics.The sociodemographic charac-
teristics included the age of the head of the household,percentage
of patients who were female, geographic region (Northeast, North
Central, South, West, and unknown), member type, andyear of entry
into the study. In addition, several sociodemographic variables defined
at the county level were merged with the patient-level data. These vari-
ables included racial composition (percentage of white, black, and other)
and income strata.
Plan Type.Fee-for-service plans were defined as plans that didnot
have an incentive for patients to use a particular list of providers and
included basic, major medical, and comprehensive health insurance
coverage. The remaining plans, called non-FFS, were defined as plans
that either required patients to choose froma list of providers or pro-
vided financial incentives to use a specific list of providers. Non-FFS
plans included exclusive provider organizations, healthmaintenance
organizations, noncapitated point-of-service plans, preferred provider
organizations, or capitated or partially capitated point-of-service
plans.
Copayments. Copayments for outpatient pharmaceuticalswere cal-
culated by first stratifying all prescription drug claims byyear, then by
plan within year. Next, we, calculated theaverage out-of-pocket patient
copayments for asthma drugs by therapeutic class for each plan,as
well as the ratio of mean controller copayments tomean reliever copay-
ments. These plan-level ratios were then attached to each patient's
record within a given plan.
We also constructed variables for theaverage out-of-pocket copay-
ments paid for outpatient physician visits, emergencyroom visits,
and hospital stays. The average copayment captured the actual dollarBenefit Plan Design and Prescription Drug Utilization 101
amount that the patients paid out-of-pocket. Note that we use the term
copayinent to refer to any out-of-pocket payment by individuals for
health care. This includes both traditional copayments (e.g., $5 per
office visit) as well as coinsurance (e.g., patient pays 20 percent of
the bill).
Comorbidities.Several asthma-related comorbidities, including
allergic rhinitis, anxiety, depression, gastroesophageal reflux disease
(GERD), and migraine, were examined. The number of unique three-
digit ICD-9 codes (International Classification of Diseases, Ninth
Revision) was used as a proxy for the extent of overall medical and
mental health comorbidities.
Charlson Index scores were generated to capture the level and bur-
den of comorbidity. This index draws on diagnostic information from
ICD-9 codes and procedure codes, resulting in nineteen conditions that
are weighted based on the adjusted risk of one-year mortality. The
index score is the sum of the weights for all of a patient's conditions
and ranges from one to six, with higher numbers indicating increased
levels of comorbidity.17 The Charlson Index has been highly effective in
predicting clinical outcomes and costs.18 A recent study by Sin and Tu
(2001) found that high levels of comorbidity as measured by the
Charlson Index, were strongly associated with the underuse of inhaled
steroid therapy in elderly patients with asthma, a finding that is of
particular importance for our research.
Utilization.Utilization of health care services or prescription drugs
was captured through claims and encounters over the study period. For
individuals, we examined the mean annualized number of emergency
room visits, hospitalizations, hospital days, outpatient visits, and
allergy/asthma specialist visits. Prescription drugs for the treatment of
persons with asthma were categorized as either controller or reliever
medications. Controllers included inhaled anti-inflammatory agents,
oral corticosteroids, oral anti-leukotrienes, and long-acting bron-
chodilators; relievers were defined as drugs categorized as anticholin-
ergics or inhaled short-acting beta-agonists. Based on this dichotomy, a
ratio of controller to relievers was constructed and interpreted as a
measure of adequate management of asthma.
Costs.The analytic file contains patients with fee-for-service health
plans and those with partially or fully capitated plans. Data on costs102 Crown, Berndt, Baser, et al.
were not available, however, for the capitated plans. Therefore, the
value of patients' service utilization under the capitated plan was
priced and imputed using average payments from the MarketScanTM
FFS inpatient and outpatient services by region, year, and procedure.
V.Econometric Methods
Our econometric analysis proceeds in two steps, using a variant of the
Lee (1983) multinomial logit selection model, as proposed by
Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (2001). First we model choice
among three alternative drug treatments: controller only, reliever only,
and a combination of controller and reliever, all on an annual basis. We
employ as identifying instruments (variables affecting choice of drug
treatment but not total expenditures) plan copayment variables, and
physician/provider prescribing composition. Then we employ least
squares regressions of log total expenditures for each treatment arm, in
addition to a usual set of covariates, the three lambda selection
terms (conditional expectations of residuals from the three arms of the
treatment selection model).
More specifically, to reduce the potential for endogeneity between
plan-level copayment variables and plan-level controller-to-reliever
ratios in the multivariate analyses, we utilize a discrete counterpart to
the plan-level controller-to-reliever ratio examined in the descriptive
analyses. In particular, we construct an annual patient-level dependent
variable with three mutually exclusive categories: a controller drug
alone (n = 3,903), a combination of a controller drug and a reliever drug
(n = 11,427), and a reliever drug alone (n = 11,049). A likelihood ratio
test was carried out to examine whether separate models were required
for the FFS and non-FFS samples. Based on the results of this test, we
estimated separate multinomial logit models for the FFS and non-FFS
subsamples. County-level income variables were appended to patient
records to augment the medical claims. Robust standard errors were
used to adjust for potential intracounty covariance among patients liv-
ing in the same counties that may have been introduced by these
variables. Hausman tests were then conducted to compare selectivity-
corrected models with standard ordinary least squares (OLS) models.
In terms of instruments, we construct two sets of identifying vari-
ables. Our first set is plan copayments. For each year and plan, we cal-
culate mean copayment values for each class of drug and then take the
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variable is utilized as a regressor in the multinomial drug treatment
choice equations for each person year. A second set involves calculat-
ing, for each physician/provider tax identification number in the
claims data, the proportion of patients obtaining controller-only,
reliever-only, and combination treatment. In many cases this taxation
identification number covers a multiphysician medical practice, but in
some cases it is unique to one physician. Because the sum ofthese three
percentages is 100 percent for each physician/provider practice, we
delete one of the three percentages but include two of them as regres-
sors in the multinomial drug treatment model. We recognizethat this
approach still leaves room for some selectivity in the form of patients'
choice of physician and choice of plan, but we believe nonetheless that
this method provides a reasonable first step in mitigating the effects of
such selectivity. We also note that, in this paper, we do not examine the
implications of treatment patterns on components of subsequent health
care utilization, although we do model total health careexpenditures.
VI.Descriptive Results
Based on the definitions of asthma episodes discussed above, we
obtained a sample that included 44,926 patients in FFS plans and 18,
305 in non-FFS plans (63,231 patients total).
Controller-to-Reliever Ratio
As shown in figure 4.1, the controller-to-reliever ratio has been rising
over time. Between 1995 and 1999, it increased byapproximately 40
percent, with more rapid increases in the two most recent years. The
ratio is consistently higher for patients in FFS plans than for those in
non-FFS plans and, since 1997, the rate of increase appears to be higher
for the FFS plan beneficiaries than for those in non-FFS plans.
Irrespective of plan type, however, almost all plans had average
controller-to-reliever ratios greater than 1 (plan-specific data not shown).
Patient Demographics
Table 4.1 reports the demographic characteristics of the sample, strati-
fied by FFS and non-FFS plans. Patients in FFS plans had a mean age of
34 years compared to 27 years for non-FFS plans (p < .001) and were
more likely to be female (57 percent versus 52 percent, p < .001). Patients
in FFS plans were also more likely than patients in non-FFS plans
to be located in the North Central region (67 percent versus 9 percent,2.5
=
0.5
FFS Non-FFS Total p
N 44,926 18,305 63,231 NA
Trigger type
(1) 2 OP asthma claims 37.05% 36.91% 37.01% 0.74
(2) Asthma ER + asthma RX 0.69% 0.82% 0.73% 0.06
(3) IP resp. inf. + asthma 0.04% 0.08% 0.05% 0.12
(4) IP asthma 0.26% 0.32% 0.28% 0.15
(5) 2 asthma R)( 61.97% 61.87% 61.94% 0.82
Mean age 34.09 27.19 32.09 <.01
% females 57.41% 52.09% 55.87% <.01
104 Crown, Berndt, Baser, et al,





Controller/reliever medication ratios by plan type and year
Table 4.1
Summary of asthma patient characteristics by insurance plan type, 1995-2000Benefit Plan Design and Prescription Drug Utilization 105
Table 4.1
(continued)
FFS Non-FFS Total p
N 44,926 18,305 63,231 NA
Geographic region
Northeast 15.63% 47.56% 24.88% <.01
North central 67.01% 8.76% 50.15% <.01
South 12.05% 32.76% 18.04% <.01
West 5.31% 10.92% 6.93% <.01
Year of trigger
1996 34.67% 13.13% 28.43% <.01
1997 20.21% 13.55% 18.28% <.01
1998 21.99% 14.62% 19.86% <.01
1999 23.13% 58.71% 33.43% <.01
Member type
Employee 40.76% 38.68% 40.16% <.01
Spouse 22.02% 17.55% 20.73% <.01
Dependents 37.21% 43.77% 39.11% <.01
4-11 years 15.76% 27.97% 19.30% <.01
12-18 years 15.94% 14.24% 15.45% <.01
Other 5.51% 1.57% 4.37% <.01
County race/ethnicity
White
0-25% 0.49% 0.84% 0.59% <.01
26-50% 1.44% 7.00% 3.05% <.01
51-75% 21.25% 35.73% 25.44% <.01
76-100% 76.82% 56.43% 70.92% <.01
Black <.01
0-25% 91.70% 76.30% 87.24% <.01
26-50% 8.02% 22.85% 12.31% <.01
51-75% 0.26% 0.85% 0.43% <.01
76-100% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.15
Hispanic
0-25% 96.76% 93.35% 95.77% <.01
26-50% 2.67% 5.52% 3.49% <.01
51-75% 0.52% 1.13% 0.69% <.01
76-100% 0.06% 0.01% 0.04% <.01
Other <.01
0-25% 99.94% 99.83% 99.91% <.01
26-50% 0.02% 0.15% 0.06% <.01
51-75% 0.04% 0.02% 0.03% 0.21
76-100% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.20
County mean household
income
27,001 31,223 28,269 <.01106 Crown, Berndt, Baser, et al.
p < .001) and were more likely to receive their health care coverage as
the employee rather than as the spouse or dependent (41 percent versus
37 percent, p < .001).
County Race and Income
Substantial differences in racial distribution and mean income between
FFS and non-FFS plans were evident from county-level U.S. census
data linked to the claims data. The mean household county income of
patients covered by FFS plans ($27,001) was significantly lower than
that for patients covered by non-FFS plans ($31,223) (p < .001). The
racial distribution in counties for patients covered by FFS plans was
less likely to be white than that of non-FFS plans.
Health Status
As expected given possibilities for adverse selection, patients in FFS
plans appear to be sicker than those in non-FFS plans. Table 4.2 docu-
ments that patients in FFS plans have higher numbers of major diag-
nostic categories; higher Charlson comorbidity scores; and higher rates
of comorbidities of allergic rhinitis, depression, gastrointestinal disor-
ders, and migraine (p < .001 for all comparisons). The rate of comorbid
anxiety was not statistically different between FFS and non-FFS plans
(p = 0.78). Qualitatively similar patterns were evident both for patients
age 4 to 11 and those age 12 to 64, although differences were typically
larger for adults than for children.
Copayments
Table 4.3 indicates that prescription drug copayments are significantly
higher in non-FFS plans than in FFS plans for both asthma medications
and nonasthma medications. Across all drugs and all years (1995-
2000), the average out-of-pocket copayment made by patients in non-
FFS plans was $8.64 compared to $5.20 in FFS plans (p < .001). As
shown in figure 4.2, however, average controller/reliever copayment
ratios were higher in FFS plans than in non-FFS plans, even as FFS plan
beneficiaries had greater controller/reliever medication utilization
ratios (see figure 4.1). In both types of plans, the controller/reliever
copayment ratio has been rising over time along with the increased use
of controller medications.
The mean copayments reported in table 4.3 mask considerable
variation in copayments over time and across plans. Figure 4.3 illus-
trates that out-of-pocket copayments for asthma medications haveBenefit Plan Design and Prescription Drug Utilization 107
Table 4.2
Comorbidities among asthma patients by insurance plan type, 1995-2000
been consistently higher for patients in non-FFS planscompared to
patients in FFS plans. Although patients in both types of plans expe-
rienced significant jumps in out-of-pocket copayments beginning in
1998, the gap between FFS and non-FFS plans appears to have nar-
rowed. In addition to these time trends, there is high variationin
copayment levels for specific drugs within a year. Forexample, 1999
copayments for fluticasone, an inhaled corticosteroid (acontroller
medication), varied from $2 in one plan to $28 in another. Similarly,
1999 copayments for albuterol, a short-acting beta-agonist(a reliever
FFS Non-FFSTotal p
All patients, N 44,926 18,305 63,231 NA
Number of major diagnostic
categories 6.26 5.35 6.00 <.01
Charlson comorbidity index 0.79 0.62 0.74 <.01
Asthma-specific comorbidites
Allergic rhinitis 23.27% 18.67% 21.94% <.01
Anxiety 2.39% 2.35% 2.38% 0.78
Depression 10.31% 8.17% 9.69% <.01
GI disorders 24.55% 20.73% 23.45% <.01
Migraine 6.02% 5.05% 5.74% <.01
Patients age 4-11, N 7,084 5,123 12,207 NA
Number of major diagnostic
categories 5.19 4.85 5.05 <.01
Charlson comorbidity index 0.55 0.51 0.53 <.01
Asthma-specific comorbidites
Allergic rhinitis 25.72% 20.69% 23.61% <.01
Anxiety 0.78% 0.49% 0.66% 0.05
Depression 4.29% 2.81% 3.67% <.01
GI disorders 15.30% 14.50% 14.97% 0.22
Migraine 3.08% 3.10% 3.09% 0.93
Patients Age 12-64, N 37,842 13,182 51,024 NA
Number of major diagnostic
categories 6.46 5.55 6.22 <.01
Charison comorbidity index 0.84 0.66 0.79 <.01
Asthma-specific comorbidites
Allergic rhinitis 22.81% 17.88% 21 .53% <.01
Anxiety 2.69% 3.07% 2.79% 0.02
Depression 11.44% 10.26% 11.13% <.01
GI disorders 26.28% 23.15% 25.47% <.01
Migraine 6.57% 5.81% 6.38% <.01108 Crown, Berndt, Baser, et al.
Table 4.3
Plan-level average copayments by insurance plan type, 1995-2000
aAverage copayment was not available for all plans.
FFS Non-FFS Total p
N 33,828 18,214 52,042 NA
Prescription copayment 5.20 8.64 6.20 <.01
For asthma-related drugs 5.06 8.04 5.92 <.01
For non-asthma-related drugs 5.24 8.83 6.28 <.01
Outpatient visit copayment 7.71 8.10 7.84 <.01
For asthma-related visits 7.83 8.25 7.97 <.01
For non-asthma-related visits 7.69 8.09 7.83 <.01
Emergency room visit copayment 10.24 13.03 11.22 <.01
For asthma-related visits 15.25 13.92 14.79 <.01
For non-asthma-related visits 9.89 12.94 10.96 <.01
Inpatient visit copayment 16.12 2.78 11.45 <.01
For asthma-related visits 18.07 1.79 12.37 <.01
For non-asthma-related visits 15.92 2.94 11.38 <.01










Trends in asthma medication copayments by plan type
medication typically sold as a generic), ranged from $2 to$12 across
plans.
Figure 4.4 reports the trend in the ratio of total payments(third-party
payer plus patient copayment) for controller versusreliever prescrip-
tion drug claims alongside the trend in the ratio of patientout-of-
pocket copayments for controller versus reliever medications.Both
ratios show an upward trend, largely reflecting theincreased use of
controller medications. Figure 4.4 clearly indicates, however, that
between 1995 and 1999, the total payment ratio rose at a steeper rate
than the copayment ratio. This trend suggests that, although large
employers and health plans were using copayments to help manage
rising prescription drug costs, at least between 1995 and 1999they
appeared to be absorbing proportionately more of the cost increase
than they transferred to beneficiaries in the form of higher copayments.
Put another way, the practice of medicine improved inthe sense of
both FFS and non-FFS beneficiaries increasing the controller/reliever
Benefit Plan Design and Prescription Drug Utilization 109-




Trends in total payment versus copayment ratios
utilization ratio, and while beneficiaries experienced increases incon-
troller/reliever copayment ratios, third-partypayers bore an even
larger increase in controller/reliever payments.
Average copayments for outpatient visits,emergency room visits,
and inpatient visits also differed between non-FFS and FFS plans (table
4.3). Although statistically significant, copayments for outpatient visits
and emergency room visits were fairly similar across non-FFS and FFS
plans. By contrast, copayments for inpatient stayswere significantly
and materially higher among patients covered by FFS plans thanwere
those covered by non-FFS plans ($16.12versus $2.78, respectively, p <
.001). Hence, while non-FFS plans had significantly highercopayment
rates for prescription drugs relative to FFS plans, the opposite took
place in terms of inpatient copayments.
Medication Use
Table 4.4 summarizes the medication use of asthma patients covered by
non-FFS and FFS health plans. Patients covered by FFS plans havea
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Table 4.4
Annualized asthma medication claims by insurance plan type, 1995-2000
higher ratio of controller-to-reliever medications than patients in
non-FFS plans (1.49 versus 1.17, p < .001), as well as a higher num-
ber of annualized asthma prescriptions (4.89 versus 4.17, p < .001).
With the exception of leukotriene modifiers (the most recent new
therapeutic agents), patients in FFS plans have more days of therapy
and higher units dispensed for each therapeutic class ofasthma
medication than do patients in non-FFS plans (p < .001 for all com-
parisons). For leukotriene modifiers, days of therapy and units dis-
pensed were higher for asthma patients covered by non-FFS plans
(p < .001).
FFS Non-FFS Total p
N 44,926 18,305 63,231 NA
Ratio of controller to reliever 1.49 1.17 1.40 <.01
Number of asthma prescriptions 4.89 4.17 4.68 <.01
Bronchodilators 0.71 0.37 0.61 <.01
Oral steroids 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.69
SABAs 2.14 2.11 2.13 0.20
Inhaled steroids 1.22 0.90 1.13 <.01
Luekotriene modifiers 0.24 0.28 0.25 <.01
Anticholinergics 0.12 0.05 0.10 <.01
Estimated days of therapy
Bronchodilators 21.99 10.43 18.64 <.01
Oral steroids 5.91 4.59 5.53 <.01
SABAs 46.44 41.75 45.09 <.01
Inhaled steroids 30.19 20.96 27.51 <.01
Luekotriene modifiers 8.89 9.09 8.94 0.61
Anticholinergics 2.89 1.07 2.36 <.01
Units dispensed
Bronchodilators 34.05 14.86 28.50 <.01
Oral steroids 18.65 18.16 18.51 0.44
SABAs 78.01 79.50 78.44 0.37
Inhaled steroids 31.33 21.46 28.47 <.01
Luekotriene modifiers 12.73 12.44 12.65 0.63
Anticholinergics 5.26 2.36 4.42 <.01
Selection of asthma medication
Bronchodilators 15.94% 9.66% 14.12% <.01
Oral steroids 23.71% 26.42% 24.50% <.01
SABAs 76.57% 80.63% 77.75% <.01
Inhaled steroids 35.00% 31 .95% 34.11% <.01
Luekotriene modifiers 5.88% 6.62% 6.09% <.01
Anticholinergics 4.14% 2.13% 3.56% <.01112 Crown, Berndt, Baser, et al.
The most commonly prescribed asthma medicationswere the short-
acting beta-agonists (SABAs). Patients in non-FFS planswere some-
what more likely than patients in FFS plans to be prescribed SABAs,
oral steroids, and leukotriene modifiers; they were less likely to bepre-
scribed bronchodilators, inhaled steroids, and anticholinergics (p< .001
for all comparisons).
Health Care Utilization
Table 4.5 reports the nonprescription drug healthcare utilization of
patients in non-FFS and FFS plans. For each measureemergency
room visits, hospitalizations, hospital days, and outpatient visits
annualized utilization was higher in FFS plans than it was innon-
FFS plans (p = 0.09 for emergency room visits). Thus, despite higher
controller/reliever medication ratios, health care utilizationwas higher
in FFS plans than it was in non-FFS plans. This association is likely to
be confounded, however, by the greater average age and level of
disease severity of patients covered by FFS plans (table 4.2).
VII.Econometric Findings
FFS Model
Table 4.6 reports the results of a multinomial logit model of the log odds
of a patient receiving controller medication alone, or a controller anda
reliever (combination therapy), relative to a reliever alone. Residents of
the North Central region are significantly less likely to be treated with
controllers alone or a combination of controllers and relievers than with
relievers alone (p < 0.01). Females were significantly less likely to
receive a combination treatment rather than a reliever-only treatment.
Table 4.5
Armualized perbeneficiary, asthma-related health care utilization by insurance plan
type, 1995-2000
FFS Non-FFS Total p
N 44,926 18,305 63,231 NA
Measures of health care use
Emergency room visits 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.09
Hospitalizations 0.08 0.05 0.07 <.01
Hospital days 0.36 0.23 0.32 <.01
Outpatient visits 5.46 1.40 4.29 <.01Benefit Plan Design and Prescription Drug Utilization 113
Table 4.6
Multinomial logit model of medication selection: patients in FFS plans'
'Reference category is reliever alone.
bcl..square test for significance of copay variables.





Intercept -3.4707 <0.001 -2.2667 <0.001
Demographics
Region North central -0.3932 <0.001 -0.1591 0.0020
Region Northeast -0.0290 0.8430 -0.0014 0.9900
Region West -0.1649 0.1410 -0.0199 0.8070
Female -0.0119 0.7700 -0.1062 <0.001
Adult 0.8893 <0.001 0.2170 <0.001
Clinical characteristics
Allergic rhinitis 0.5128 <0.001 0.6086 <0.001
Migraine -0.0270 0.7380 -0.0390 0.5220
Depression -0.1795 0.0060 -0.0067 0.8850
GI disorders -0.0537 0.2740 -0.1022 0.0050
Sinusitis -0.0655 0.1520 0.0110 0.7400
Anxiety disorders -0.1843 0.1320 -0.2209 0.0150
3-digit ICD-9 codes 0.0483 <0.001 0.0481 <0.001
County characteristics
County average income
$15-20K 0.2960 0.3290 -0.0804 0.6810
County average income
$20-25K 0.4274 0.1550 0.0241 0.9010
County average income
$25-35K 0.3661 0.2240 0.0713 0.7140
County average income
>$35K 0.8503 0.0050 0.1602 0.4170
Copay variables
Ratio of controller/reliever
copayment -0.0667 0.5030 0.0308 0.6820
Tax provider ID
controller, % 6.4705 <0.001 1.1769 0.1840
Tax provider ID
combination, % 1.0605 0.0320 4.1513 <0.001
Chi2(3)1' 60.3200 <0.001 164.5700 <0.001
LR chi2(38) 1816.3600 <0.001
Psuedo-R2 0.0341
Number of observations 26,379114 Crown, Berndt, Baser, et al.
Adults were more likely to receive a controller aloneor a combination
treatment (with the former being particularly large) than a reliever-only
treatment.
We also included county-level variables from thecensus as proxies for
the income of patientsvariables not available directly from the claims.
Living in a county with the highest category ofaverage income
(>$35,000) significantly increased the odds of receiving a controller-only
treatment but had no significant effect on combination treatment relative
to reliever-only treatments. None of the other county characteristic
income variables was statistically significant.
The presence of allergic rhinitis increased the odds of gettinga con-
troller alone or a combination therapy relative to reliever-only therapy.
Comorbidities of migraine or sinusitis had no significant impacton
choice of drug therapy. Depression reduced the odds of gettingcon-
troller-only therapy relative to reliever alone but hadno significant
impact on combination therapy. The presence ofan anxiety disorder
increased the odds of getting a combination therapy (p< 0.02) but had
no significant impact on the odds of receiving a controller alone. The
number of unique three-digit ICD-9 codes was positively associated
with the odds of getting a controller alone or a controller plus reliever
relative to reliever-only therapy.
The ratio of plan mean controller to mean relievercopay had no sig-
nificant impact on drug treatment choice (p > 0.50). In resultsnot
shown in a table or figure, this lack of significance persisted when
mean copays were entered separately in levels or in various other
forms. On the other hand, the medication ratios measuring physi-
cian/provider prescribing preferences for controller alone (p< 0.01) or
for combination treatment (p < 0.01)were positive, large, and highly
significant determinants for the probability of the patient receiving that
therapy relative to reliever-only therapy. In terms of cross-effects, only
physician/provider prescribing preferences for combination therapy
positively and significantly affected the probability ofa patient receiv-
ing controller-only therapy; physician/provider preferences forcon-
troller-only therapy had no significant impacton the patient's
probability of receiving combination treatment (p0.184). The chi-
square test statistic for the null hypothesis that coefficient estimates on
the copay and physician/provider prescribing preference variablesare
simultaneously equal to zero indicate decisive rejection in both
equations (p <0.01).Benefit Plan Design and Prescription Drug Utilization 115
Non-FFS Model
Table 4.7 reports the results of the corresponding multinomial logit
model for patients in non-FFS plans. Living in the West reduced the
odds of receiving either controller-only or combination treatment rela-
tive to reliever-only therapy. Residents of the North Central region were
more likely to receive combination treatmentbut not controller-only
therapy, relative to reliever alone treatment. As in the FFS case, females
were significantly less likely to receivecombination therapy, relative to
reliever-only therapy, and adults were more likely to receive a controller
alone or a combination therapy (with the former being particularly
large), relative to reliever-only treatment. None of the county-level
income variables from the census was statistically significant.
The presence of allergic rhinitis significantly increased the odds of
getting controller-only or combination therapy relative to reliever-
only treatment; the effects of other comorbidities were similar in this
non-FFS regression to those in the FFS analysis. Higher numbers of
unique three-digit ICD-9 codes significantly increased the odds of get-
ting a controller-only or combination therapy relative to reliever-only
treatment.
As with the FFS model, the ratio of plan mean controller to mean
reliever copayment had no significant impact on the probability of
receiving controller-only therapy, although it did have a positive and
significant impact on the odds of receiving combination treatment. On
the other hand, both medication percentages measuring provider pre-
scribing preferences were highly significant determinants of the prob-
ability of a patient receiving the corresponding therapy; while these
own effects were positive and significant,both cross-effects were not
statistically significant. The chi-square test statistics for the null
hypothesis that coefficients on the copay and provider prescriber pref-
erence variables simultaneously equal zero indicatedecisive rejection
in both equations (p <0.01).
Turning now to the log total expenditure regressions for FFS
(table 4.8) and non-FFS (table 4.9) beneficiaries, we provide parameter
estimates with and without the sample selectivity adjustments for each
of the three treatment arms. In the FFS regressions of table 4.8, we note
first that parameter estimates on the lambdas (conditional expected
values of the residuals derived from each of multinomial logistic equa-
tions) are negative and statistically significant (all p < 0.001). Not sur-
prisingly, differences between the selectivity-adjusted and unadjusted116 Crown, Berndt, Baser, et al.
parameter estimates are particularly large for those variables signifi-
cantly affecting prescriber therapy in the first-stage multinomial logit
equations. For example, coefficient estimates on the adult variable in
all three equations are much smaller in the selectivity-adjusted than in
the unadjusted regressions; this finding also holds for the allergic
rhinitis variable, where sign changes occur.
However, when a Hausman test is conducted to test whether the
coefficient estimates differ significantly in the selectivity-adjusted and
unadjusted OLS regressions with the FFS sample, the null hypothesis
of parameter equality is not rejected. Indeed, the test statistic isnega-
tive, a reflection of the fact that the difference in diagonal elements of
the variance-covariance matrices can be negative in given samples,
even though asymptotically they are positive in expectation.
In terms of the non-FFS sample (table 4.9), results are qualitatively
similar to those in the FFS population. In particular, estimates of the
three lambdas are negative and significant in all three treatmentequa-
tions (p < 0.001), with the exception of the reliever-only equation,
where the negative estimate is not statistically significant. Two of the
three Hausman test statistics on parameter equality in the selectivity-
adjusted and unadjusted OLS regressions are positive, but in all three
cases the null hypothesis is not rejected.
VIII.Discussion and Limitations
This study describes the patterns of medication useamong patients
with asthma, factors affecting the type of drug therapy prescribed for
these patients, and the effects on total health care expenditures usinga
data set containing medical claims and encounters formore than 63,000
asthma patients. The average controller-to-reliever ratioswere found to
be greater than 1 for members of non-FFS (1.17) and FFS (1.49) plans.
The controller/reliever medication ratio has been consistently rising
over time, suggesting that the clinical practices it embodies reflects a
considerable degree of acceptance of the consensus guidelines and the
supporting research literature.
Holding other factors equal, one would theoretically expect higher
relative prices for controller-to-reliever medicines to be associated with
a lower controller-to-reliever ratio. However, teasing this conclusion
out of the data statistically is complex. Shifts in the composition of
drugs in the controller and reliever classes over time and changes in
plan design could cause the ratio of controller-to-relievercopays eitherBenefit Plan Design and Prescription Drug Utilization 117
Table 4.7
Multinomial logit model of medication selection: patients in non-FFS plan?
aReference category is reliever alone.





Intercept -6.1203 <0.001 -5.2240 <0.001
Demographics
Region: North Central -0.2239 0.0880 -0.1658 0.0440
Region: Northeast -0.2124 0.0960 -0.0735 0.3350
Region: West -0.2940 0.0170 -0.3179 <0.001
Female -0.0941 0.2870 -0.1897 <0.001
Adult 1.1020 <0.001 0.2973 <0.001
Clinical characteristics
Allergic rhinitis 0.8721 <0.001 0.7965 <0.001
Migraine -0.0033 0.9870 0.1745 0.2130
Depression 0.0975 0.5540 -0.1856 0.1160
GI disorders -0.0568 0.6290 -0.1773 0.0230
Sinusitis 0.0685 0.5400 0.0651 0.3690
Anxiety disorders -0.6812 0.0450 -0.3315 0.1250
3-digit ICD-9 codes 0.0667 <0.001 0.0632 <0.001
County characteristics
County average income
$15-20K -0.2739 0.5990 -0.2224 0.5050
County average income
$20-25K -0.1448 0.7660 -0.1310 0.6770
County average income
$25-35K -0.1357 0.7770 -0.2558 0.4080
County average income
>$35K -0.3545 0.4770 -0.3857 0.2280
Copay variables
Ratio of controller!
reliever copayments 0.0816 0.7120 0.6444 <0.001
Tax ID prescriber
controller, % 11.4306 0.0030 1.0697 0.6640
Tax ID prescriber
combination, % 6.6881 0.0650 11.1009 <0.001
Chi2(3) 16.1400 0.0011 53.6800 <0.001
LR chi2(38) 598.6700 <0.001
Psuedo-R2 0.0463
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to rise or to fall over time. After controlling for other variables,we do
not find a statistically significant relationship between out-of-pocket
copayments and asthma treatment patterns. Figure 4.4 indicates that
total payments (third-party payer plus patient copay) have been rising
more rapidly than copayments only, suggesting that health plans and
large employers are reluctant to increase copayments for covered ben-
eficiaries at the same rate that total payments have increased. In this
sense and over this 1995-1999 period, health plans and payers have
contributed to greater diffusion of guideline-compatibletreatments
that favor increases in the controller-to-reliever ratio.
The observation that the prescribing of all classes of asthma medica-
tions (except leukotriene modifiers) was greateramong members of
FFS plans is generally consistent with the findings that thesepatients
are sicker than their counterparts in non-FFS plans, as measured by the
number of comorbid conditions and higher levels of healthcare uti-
lization. Asthma patients covered by FFS health plans mademore
extensive use of all other types of health services that we examined,
including inpatient hospitalizations, use ofemergency services, and
ambulatory visits.
The principal objective of this study has been to examine whether
and how the characteristics of health plancoverage as part of the
employee benefits program affects the therapy selection decision
among patients with asthma. Most of the clinical literature now sug-
gests that patients with asthma experience more favorable clinical
courses when they make regular use, often several times daily, of
inhaled corticosteriods, leukotriene modifiers, and other medications
that control inflammation and reversible airway disease. In the
descriptive analysis, we found that the controller-to-reliever ratiocon-
tinued to rise (and its increase even accelerated in recent years) despite
rising medication copays. However, this apparent association between
mean copayments at the plan level and plan-level controller-to-reliever
ratios is potentially endogenous. For example, ifmean copayments are
higher for controller medications than theyare for reliever medica-
tions, growing use of controllers would result ina rising mean copay-
ment ratio for controller-to-reliever medications. That is, at the plan
level, the direction of influence between the controller-to-reliever
copayments and the controller-to-reliever ratio could go in either
direction, or even both ways.
To reduce the endogeneity problem,we examined the effect of plan-
level copayment variables on individual treatment choices. WhenweBenefit Plan Design and Prescription Drug Utilization 123
did so, no statistically significant association wasfound. It is possible
that this lack of association resulted from an understatementof the
size of out-of-pocket copayments. This understatementis due to the
averaging of patient copays across asthma drugsand years at the plan
level, an effort we undertook to reduce the number ofdegrees of free-
dom consumed by plan-, drug-, and year-specific copayments.Most
of the large copayment increases have occurred since 1999.Plans that
instituted large copayment increases for certain asthmadrugs may
indeed have shifted asthma treatment patterns. In ouranalysis, how-
ever, these more recent changes wereaggregated with the earlier
experience of patients where copayment changes were not as com-
mon nor as large. Thus, we expectthat a downward bias exists in our
estimate of the copayment effect and that it deservesfurther scrutiny.
We have re-estimated our models using only 1998-2000data, and
while we obtained results on the copay variables thattrended more
toward becoming statistically significant, they were notsignificant at
usual p values. We suspect that these copay variableswill become
more significant as additional yearsof post-2000 data are added to the
sample.
On the other hand, we found that physician/providerprescribing
patterns were strongly associated with patienttreatment patterns,
although the nature of this association differed somewhatfor patients
in FFS and non-FFS plans. We leave it for futureresearch to assess
whether (controlling for physician/practice prescribingpreferences)
differences in copayment benefit design across plansserviced by the
same physician/practice result instatistically different treatment pat-
terns. Of course, it is possible instead thatphysician/practice effects
are dominant regardless of thevariation in the copayment benefit
designs of the plans covering the patients they treat.Resolution of this
issue will have important implications for theeffectiveness of plan
design in controlling health care costs.
In addition to the specific statistical issues alreadydiscussed, the
conclusions from our analysis should be viewed in lightof the limita-
tions common to most retrospective studies. Inparticular, although we
have attempted to correct for selection biasassociated with patients
having higher versus lower controller-to-reliever ratios,other sources
of selection bias may remain. For example, theMarketScan'M claims
data used in the analysis lack clinical measures of symptomseverity
(e.g., results of spirometry tests). In addition, missingdata on within-
region location (e.g., rural, urban, suburban)could have introduced124 Crown, Berndt, Baser, et al.
bias because of geographical variations in asthmatreatment practice
patterns.
Although future work is unlikely to be able to control forall sources
of selection bias in retrospective database studies of thetype reported
here, the physician/provider prescribing pattern variablesappear to
offer promise as identifying variables. For example, futurework could
use instrumental variables or parametric selection models to control for
unobserved factors associated with both treatment selectionand out-
comes when examining the effects of asthma treatments on healthcare
utilization. This general approach is also likely to have broadapplica-
bility to other medical conditions and treatments.
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